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Bank competition, risk taking and productive efficiency: 
Evidence from Nigeria’s banking reform experiments 
 
Abstract 
 
We propose a three-stage procedure for investigating the interrelationships among bank 
competition, risk taking and efficiency. The procedure is applied to Nigeria’s banking reforms 
(1993-2008). Stage I measures bank productive efficiency, using Data Envelopment Analysis, 
and the evolution of bank competition, using Conjectural Variations (CV) methods. Stage II 
uses the CV estimates to test whether regulatory reforms influence bank competition. Stage III 
investigates the impact of the reforms and concomitant changes in competition on bank 
behaviour. The evidence suggests that deregulation and prudential re-regulation influence 
bank risk taking and bank productive efficiency directly (direct impact) and via their impact 
on competition (indirect impact). Further, it is found that as competition increases, excessive 
risk taking decreases and efficiency increases. Overall, the evidence affirms policies that 
foster bank competition, at least in the Nigerian context.  
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1. Introduction 
The public policy paradigm on banking regulation and supervision has shifted from 
“economic regulation” to deregulation and concomitant prudential re-regulation (Padoa-
Schioppa, 2001)1. Competition plays a crucial role in the overall design of such a policy 
framework. On the one hand, the economic justification of financial deregulation is based on 
the presumption that deregulation fosters bank competition, which in turn has a positive effect 
on bank productive efficiency. Specifically, bank competition is seen as a stimulus to exert 
downward pressure on costs, reduce managerial slack and even incentivise technology 
innovation (Nickell, 1996). On the other hand, concern about the adverse impact of increased 
competition on bank risk taking behaviour has motivated the adoption of prudential re-
regulation alongside deregulation. Competition is viewed as the driving force to erode banks’ 
monopoly profits, reduce the opportunity cost of going bankrupt, and increase banks’ 
incentives to take excessive risk. Although it is designed to mitigate excessive risk taking and 
foster stability, prudential re-regulation imposes higher regulatory costs and may hamper 
competition. In general, therefore, such a mixed process of deregulation and prudential re-
regulation may have opposite effects upon bank behaviour with respect to competition, risk 
taking and production efficiency, at least in theory. 
 It is curious that there appears to be hardly any clear empirical evidence on what, in 
theory, are opposite effects of policy reforms on some key aspects of bank behaviour. While 
there are numerous papers which evaluate the impact of financial reforms on bank efficiency 
and productivity, or the impact of reforms on competition, or the relationship between 
competition and banks’ risk taking, the evidence is inconclusive (as shown in Section 2). 
Moreover, the existing literature tends to look at each one of the three aspects of bank 
                                                 
1 The “economic regulation” regime comprises measures of a structural nature by limiting competition. The 
regulators prescribe specialisation and prices, and take responsibility for potential prudential problems. 
Prudential activities by banks are less important. In contrast, a prudential re-regulation regime focuses on market 
efficiency, by relaxing structural rules and encouraging incentive-based prudential behaviour by banks.  
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performance separately. The inextricable intertwined relation among the ‘trinity’ of bank 
performance (i.e., bank competition, risk taking and production efficiency), has not been 
investigated empirically. In addition, there is little understanding of the role played by the 
implementation of prudential re-regulation in financial reform processes. Moreover, since the 
issue of regulation and its effect on competition, productive efficiency and financial stability is 
complex and multi-faceted, careful consideration of all the factors at work is essential for a 
sound empirical analysis of the effectiveness of policy (Allen and Gale, 2004). 
This paper aims to investigate whether and how such mixed policies of deregulation 
and prudential re-regulation affect the important interrelated aspects of bank performance, 
namely competitive conduct, risk taking and productive efficiency. The main contributions of 
the paper are threefold. First, it aims to fill the above gaps in the literature, with particular 
reference to Nigeria’s banking reform experiments, implemented during 1993-2008 (detailed 
in Section 3). The study of Nigeria’s commercial banking reforms over an important period of 
recent economic history complements a large, mostly qualitative, literature on banking sector 
development in Africa. Second, our methodological innovation is that in order to carry out our 
analysis, we develop a three-stage modelling procedure. In the first stage, we measure 
productive efficiency of banks using non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). We 
estimate the evolution of the degree of competition over time through the conjectural 
variations (CV) approach in line with the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) 
literature. In the second stage, we use the time-varying CV estimates of competition to test 
whether and how the change in the regulatory environment influences competitiveness 
conditions in the market place. In the third stage, we investigate the impact of the change in 
regulatory environment and the associated changes in the degree of competition on bank risk 
taking and bank productive efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, such a three-stage 
analysis has not been used in the existing banking literature. Third, we find new evidence that 
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deregulation and prudential re-regulation influence bank risk taking and bank productive 
efficiency directly (direct impact) and via their impact on competition (indirect impact). The 
evidence also suggests that as competition increases, excessive risk taking decreases and 
efficiency increases. Overall, the new evidence affirms policies that foster bank competition, 
at least in the context of Nigeria’s bank regulatory reforms. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses previous research on 
the effects of financial reforms on bank production efficiency and competition, and on 
relationship between competition and risk taking behaviour. Section 3 briefly reviews the 
experiment of banking sector reforms implemented in Nigeria during 1993-2008. Section 4 
explains the empirical methodology, including the choice of variables and data issues. 
Estimation results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
Orthodox microeconomic theory predicts that deregulation positively affects bank efficiency 
and productivity by reducing regulatory costs imposed on market participants. Also, 
deregulation relaxes the regulatory restrictions on banking activities and promotes 
competition. A considerable body of the empirical literature has examined the impact of 
financial reforms on banks’ production performance, measured either by efficiency or 
productivity, without accounting for the effects through competition and risk-taking. Overall, 
the evidence appears to be mixed, with some studies reporting improvements in productivity 
and others suggesting little, no, or even negative productivity growth (Zhao et al., 2008). 
Controversy exists not only on whether deregulation stimulates productivity growth, but also 
on the sources of productivity growth. While some studies show that productivity growth is 
due to technological progress (e.g. Reztis, 2006; Tortosa-Ausina et al., 2008), others attribute 
it to efficiency improvement (e.g. Worthington, 1999; Isik and Hassan, 2003).  
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 However, empirical findings suggest that the general belief that deregulation promotes 
competition cannot be demonstrated empirically always. There is a vast body of literature on 
the link between the observable market structure and performance, in the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) context. However, there is no conclusive evidence on how regulatory 
changes in the late 1990s affected the structure, conduct and performance relationship in the 
financial sector (Canoy et al., 2001). Alternative techniques, from the NEIO literature, depart 
from the SCP paradigm and attempt to infer the degree of competition by analysing banks’ 
conduct, without referring to the observable market structure. The empirical evidence derived 
from the NEIO approach also appears to be controversial. While some studies document a 
positive link between deregulation and competition (e.g. Angelini and Cetorelli, 2000; 
Canhono, 2004; Claessens and Laeven, 2004), there is no evidence of an increase in 
competition following the rapid deregulation and market liberalisation processes in the EU 
area (Maudos and Fernandez De Guevara, 2004; Fernandez De Guevara et al., 2005), or UK 
banking market (Matthews et al., 2007), or the Uruguayan banking sector (Spiller and Favaro, 
1984). The reasons of the conflicting evidence are not clear. Among other reasons, the 
oligopolistic banking market structure could be a contributory element. As banking sectors are 
generally characterized by high concentration, collusive behaviour is not uncommon 
(Demetriades and Luintel, 1996). In a highly concentrated oligopolistic market, the freedom 
granted by deregulation over both interest rates and credit allocation may give more scope for 
collusive behaviour by banks to achieve maximum monopoly profit (Park and Kim, 1994). 
Clearly, in a highly concentrated oligopolistic market, incumbents will be in a better position 
to reorganise their interests to face the threat posed by potential entrants (Roland, 2008).  
Indeed, the empirical evidence has shown that a bank cartel stepped in to fix interest rates 
whenever the authorities relaxed their control over lending or deposit rates (Demetriades and 
Luintel, 2001). Moreover, regulatory reforms are often a mixed process of deregulation and 
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prudential re-regulation and the role played by the implementation of prudential re-regulation 
alongside deregulation on competition has not been well understood (Carletti et al., 2008; 
Matthews et al., 2007). To correct for banks’ risk taking incentives, prudential re-regulation 
encompasses new requirements in the input mix and production procedures to produce 
outputs. Changes in banks’ production and exchange relationship may impact on the entry and 
exit conditions of the banking industry. The risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio, the fulcrum 
of a prudential approach to regulation, for example, would limit the development of 
competitive market forces since the increase of mandatory capital requirement acts as one of 
the entry barriers (Neuberger, 1998). In contrast with the traditional view, Schargrodsky and 
Sturzenegger (2000) theoretically demonstrate and empirically show that a tightening of 
capital requirement facilitates competition because it induces exit from the industry, and leads 
banks to choose a lower degree of specialization along geographical and sectoral dimensions. 
Market segmentation is reduced, which intensifies price competition among banks.  
 The parallel research on the effect of financial reforms and competition on banks’ risk 
taking behaviour, again, yields contentious results. Relaxing restrictions on banking activities 
may encourage banks’ risk-taking by giving banks more opportunities to take on greater risk. 
Yet, as well, it may weaken the risks banks are taking, by increasing the scope for 
diversification and removing barriers for cost-saving and revenue-generating (Gonzalez, 
2005).  The increase in the number of market participants may lead to riskier bank portfolios 
and higher failure probabilities; because interbank rivalry gives lower-quality borrowers more 
opportunities to get a loan since they can go to another bank once their loan application is 
rejected at one bank (Shaffer, 1998). Yet, also, interbank rivalry may be undermined by 
inducing banks to avoid winning bad borrowers through competitors. Although there exists 
evidence to support the idea of a negative relationship between competition and stability, 
some recent studies have suggested that the perverse link between competition and risk taking 
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is not robust when the bank-borrower relationship and banks’ monitoring function in the 
provision of loans are taken into account explicitly (Allen and Gale, 2004; Boyd and De 
Nicolo, 2005). While it may erode the charter value of the banking system by squeezing out 
abnormal returns associated with anti-competitive conduct, increased competition would 
speed up the reallocation of charter value across banks, fuelling the incentives of banks to 
differentiate themselves by dealing with asymmetric information (Boot and Thakor, 2000). 
While Rhoades and Rutz (1982), Keeley (1990) and Dick (2006) show that deregulation and 
competition destabilize the banking system, others studies, for example, Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005), Boyd et al. (2007) and Yeyati and Micco (2007), indicate that banks tend to behave 
more prudentially in a more competitive environment with less regulatory restrictions.  
 In addition to the disagreement in the existing literature on the relationship either 
among deregulation, competition and production performance, or among deregulation, 
competition and risk taking, a systematic examination on the interaction among financial 
reforms, competition, risk taking and production performance is missing. Taking advantage of 
the deregulation and prudential re-regulation experience of the Nigerian commercial banking 
sector between 1993 and 2008, this paper brings together the three branches of literature in 
order to study the impact of those reform initiatives on banks’ productive efficiency and risk 
taking, including the direct and indirect impact through competition. 
3. Key reforms in the Nigeria banking sector 
Nigeria has the second largest financial sector in Africa in terms of bank assets, market 
capitalization, and the number of listed companies in the stock market, after South Africa. The 
banking sector is the main source of financing in the Nigerian financial sector. Bank loans are 
the predominant source of debt financing.  
 Nigeria embarked on a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986, of which 
deregulation of the banking sector was an integral element. The objective was to enhance bank 
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efficiency in savings mobilization and financial intermediation, through increased 
competition. Deregulation also promoted market determined interest rates and credit 
allocation. Restrictions on foreign exchange and capital movement were relaxed. However, 
the reforms of 1986 to 1993, in general, were not sustainable and suffered several reversals. It 
has been argued that the new entrants were attracted by trading in foreign exchange rather 
than intermediation, as evidence by the co-existence of the increase in the number of market 
participants and increased disintermediation (Beck et al., 2005). The combination of weak 
skills (e.g. credit scoring, risk assessment) and ethical issues (e.g. corruption, insider lending) 
contributed to the deterioration of banks loan portfolio (Brownbridge, 1998). The dramatic 
increase in the number of banks over-stretched the capacity of regulation. The poor 
performance of banks had been accumulating, but was well disguised due to the absence of 
prudential supervision; perhaps, it was even encouraged by the regulatory neglect and 
forbearance. It was finally brought into light with the classification of financial reporting 
under the 1990-1991 prudential regulation guidelines (Lewis and Stein, 1997). The economic 
recession and political instability hastened the decline; by mid-1993, half of the licensed banks 
were distressed or insolvent, placing at risk two-thirds of assets and close to 75% of deposits.   
 Further new reforms were introduced post-1993. The mandatory capital level was 
increased up to N500 million, while the statutory minimum risk-weighted capital ratio 
remained at 8% in 1997. The period of 1998-2004 witnessed aggressive re-deregulation. 
Interest rate deregulation is re-implemented in 1997 and entry restriction was again relaxed in 
1999. Universal banking was adopted from 2001. Banks were allowed to undertake various 
financial service activities which encompassed both money and capital markets as well as 
insurance business. There was no geographical restriction either.  The adoption of universal 
banking in Nigeria necessitated the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to strengthen the 
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regulatory and supervisory framework. The requirement of capital base was increased to N2 
billion in 2002, while the risk-weighted capital ratio was raised to 10%.  
 Beginning in 2004 to date, the new phase was labelled “big bang”. CBN announced a 
new 13-point reform agenda in July, 2004. As a whole, the new reform agenda is intended to 
promote soundness, stability and efficiency of the Nigerian banking system and to enhance its 
competitiveness in the African regional and global financial system. Of those 13 points, one is 
to demands all commercial banks (i.e. universal banks) to raise the minimum capital base to 
N25 billion within approximately 18 months (i.e. by December 2005) with the statutory 
minimum risk-weighted capital ratio maintaining at 10%.  When the new reform agenda was 
announced, of 89 banks operating in the banking market, about 5-10 banks’ capital base were 
already above the N25 billion; 11-30 banks’ capital base was within the N10 to N20 billion; 
the remaining 50 to 60 banks were quite below the N10 billion. The attempt to meet the 
minimum capital base triggers the merger and acquisition2 in the industry. Further, banks raise 
capital from domestic capital market and through foreign direct investment.  This leads to the 
increase of the share of the Nigerian banking industry’s capitalization as a percentage of stock 
market capitalization from 24% in 2004 to 38% by 2006, directly contributing to the growth of 
the market capitalization and the market’s liquidity during 2005-2006. At the end of the 18 
months given by the CBN, only 25 out of 89 banks were standing3.  With 21 private publicly 
quoted banks, 4 foreign banks, and there is no government-owned bank.  
 The reform approaches ranging from deregulation to prudential re-regulation have 
brought about the changes in the size, structure and operational characteristics of the Nigerian 
banking system. As seen in Figure 1, the three development indicators measured as a 
percentage of GDP, namely the total saving (i.e. the sum of saving and time deposits) with 
                                                 
2 Mergers and outright acquisition/takeover is specified as the only legal model of consolidation in the guidelines 
for the consolidation issued by the CBN.  
3 14 banks accounting for 6.5 percent of deposits failed to meet the recapitalization criteria and had their licenses 
revoked in 2005.  
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commercial banks, the credit to private sector granted by the commercial banks and the total 
assets of the commercial banking, commonly had a downward trending during 1993-1997, and 
reversed into increasing 1997 onwards at the time when the deregulation policy was re-
introduced. This suggests that the commercial banking sector has gained increased importance 
in economic growth despite that the disclosure of distressed banks and the exit of banks that 
can not meet the increased requirement on capital base in 2005.  
    [insert Figure 1 about here] 
It is shown that the difference between total assets as a percentage of GDP and credit 
to private sector as a percentage of GDP becomes larger, especially after 1997, suggesting that 
the growth of credit to private sector lags behind that of total assets, an evidence of the 
restructure and reorientation of banks’ business focus. Similarly, the difference between the 
ratio of credit to private sector over GDP and that of saving over GDP also increased, mainly 
after 2001. This indicates that commercial banks are able to raise alternative financial resource 
in addition to saving and time deposits to provide financing support to the private sector. 
Presumably, the increase of the required capital base is one of alternative channels.  
 In terms of the market structure and performance indicators (Table 1), although the 
number of banks dramatically decreased after 2005, because of policy induced consolidation 
and exit, the number of branches appears to be stable. This implies that the remaining 25 
banks represent the hub of the financial intermediation of the Nigerian commercial banking 
and the strength of its branch network to raise deposit from society has not been negatively 
affected by the “big bang”. This also corresponds to the continuous increase of the ratio of 
saving raised by the commercial banking sector over GDP and the ratio of credit to private 
sector over GDP 2004 onwards. The three-bank concentration ratio (CR3) shows that the 
decrease of the number of banks is accompanied by the decrease of concentration, indicating 
the increase of the market size of the banking system on one hand and the reshuffling of the 
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market share among the market participants on the other. Overhead cost as a percentage of 
total assets, an indicator of non-financial cost of intermediation, is decreasing. The 
profitability, measured by pre-tax profit divided by financial capital, also appears to be 
downward trending, so does net interest margin. 
    [insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
In terms of the quality of loan portfolio (Table 2), non-performing loans (NPLs) as a 
percentage of total credit consistently decrease over time, suggesting that the quality of loan 
portfolios in relative terms improves. What is noteworthy is that the decrease of NPL ratio 
seems to go hand by hand with the increase of the absolute amount of NPLs. The only 
exception is 2006, which mainly contributes to the cleaning up of the balance sheet of the 
remaining 25 banks due to the “big bang”. The increase in the absolute amount of NPLs 
implies that the increment of NPLs has been higher than the recovery of NPLs. The finding 
that the NPL burden was accumulated although NPLs in percentage terms decrease sheds light 
on the likely “window dressing” of banks: banks bring down their NPLs ratio not through the 
recovering NPLs but rather through inflating their loan portfolio. Indeed, the correlation 
coefficient of natural logarithm of total credit and that of NPLs is 0.969. The correlation 
coefficient of natural logarithm of NPL ratio and that of NPL is -0.682. The results depict an 
interesting interrelationship among these three factors. The increase of the absolute amount of 
NPLs is not positively but rather negatively related to NPLs ratio since it is accompanied by 
the increase of the amount of loans which dilutes NPLs in percentage terms. 
  Finally, in terms of the risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio (CRAR) (Table 3), 
data show that it increases significantly after the “big bang”, although the “big bang” only 
applies to minimum capital base while the 10% statutory CRAR unchanged. However, given 
the fact that the required minimum capital base was increased from N2 billion in 2004 to N 25 
billion in 2005, i.e. 12.5 times, the increase of CRAR from 14.17% to 22.6% may not as 
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impressive as it looks like. There is a concern that the increase of capital base is accompanied 
by the increase of risk-weighted assets, as suggested by Table 3.  
    [insert Table 3 about here] 
4. Research methodology 
4.1 Stage I: the measurement of bank productive efficiency and competitive conduct 
The research methodology is designed as a three stage procedure. The first stage is the 
measurement of bank productive efficiency as well as bank competitive conduct.  
4.1.1 The measurement of bank productive efficiency 
To measure bank productive efficiency, we use non-parametric DEA with an output-
maximization orientation.4 DEA constructs a piece-wise linear convex frontier from a linear 
combination of the best observed practices in the sample at a point in time. By taking the 
constructed frontier as a proxy for available production technology, DEA assesses the 
efficiency of each bank, benchmarked against the frontier. Compared to the competing 
parametric techniques, non-parametric DEA works well on small sample size and it avoids 
errors caused by inappropriate assumptions about the functional form of the production 
process and the distribution of the inefficiency term. The measure of output-oriented 
productive efficiency reflects the extent to which outputs can be improved from a given level 
of inputs, without changing the output mix. We choose an output-maximisation orientation 
mainly because the purpose of this paper is to study the impact of financial reforms and 
competition in Nigeria’s banking sector on the ability of banks to raise deposits and 
intermediate them into loans and other earning assets.  
 The DEA frontier shifts over time, which needs to be taken into account in order to 
derive information on trends in bank production performance, particularly when the time span 
                                                 
4 DEA is a mathematical linear programming tool, based on Farrell (1957) and Charnes et al. (1978, 1981). 
 12
is relatively long or if the examination is undertaken after financial reforms. Since reforms are 
characterised by changes in incentives and constraints, their impact on banks’ production 
performance includes efficiency change and technology change (Wheelock and Wilson, 
1999). It is possible to calculate changes in banks’ production performance using DEA-type 
Malmquist index, but a relatively large sample size is required to calculate the DEA frontier 
and evaluate efficiency on a yearly basis. We have a limited sample size and need to preserve 
the degrees of freedom, so we follow Bhattacharyya et al., (1997) and adopt a “grand DEA 
frontier approach”. Specifically, we use DEA to identify a single grand frontier which 
envelops the pooled input-output data of all sample banks in all sample periods. Hence, the 
grand DEA frontier provides a single benchmark over the pooled sample against which to 
assess production performance; the productive efficiency scores derived contain information 
on the change in production performance over time. 
 We model the bank production process to comprise three inputs, 
0),,( 321  itititit xxxx (interest expense, 1x , non-interest expense, 2x , and financial capital, 
3x ), and three outputs, 0),,( 321  itititit yyyy  (loans, 1y , other earning assets, 2y , and 
deposits, 3y ). The DEA output-oriented productive efficiency of bank i (i is the bank) in year t 
(t is the time period), ),( itit yxE , against the single frontier envelopment surface from the 
pooled input-output data of all sample banks in all sample periods, is given by:  
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The objective of equation (1) is to search   (i.e. the reciprocal of the productive 
efficiency score for the ith bank in the sample) and   (i.e. the weights used by the identified 
best practice banks to construct the same input level as the ith bank being analyzed).  Equation 
(1) is solved for each bank at each sample period. ),( itit yxE  is the scalar productive 
efficiency score in 1),(0  itit yxE . Values of ),( itit yxE  equal to 1 indicate efficiency: the 
ith bank is a technically productive efficient bank which is located on the grand frontier of the 
output possibility set from a given level of inputs. Values of ),( itit yxE  smaller than 1 indicate 
inefficiency: the minimum radial expansion of all outputs of a particular inefficient bank 
without changing its input level to reach the projected points on the grand frontier, which is 
equivalent to a {[1/ ),( itit yxE ]-1}*100 percentage change. Table 4 summarises the definitions 
of inputs and outputs used in Equation (1). 
    [insert Table 4 about here] 
4.1.2  The measurement of competitive conduct 
To measure the degree of competition, we adopt a CV approach. The approach is based on the 
principle that, in short-run equilibrium, profit-maximizing banks choose prices or quantities 
where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The degree of competition in the market place 
reflects banks’ competitive conduct in an oligopolistic setting, without reference to the 
observable market structure. We prefer the CV approach, to the reduced-form analysis of the 
SCP paradigm and the Panzar and Rosse method, because it has several important advantages. 
First, it is a structural approach, which captures the demand, cost, and profit-maximizing 
conditions faced by banks. Hence, not only does it offer a measure of competition but it also 
provides insight into the sources of the estimated competitive conduct (Kadiyali et al., 2000). 
Second, it is more suitable than the Panzar and Rosse H-statistics for exploring factors 
associated with the variation of the estimated competitive conduct (Shaffer, 2004). The 
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estimated CV parameters can be treated as continuous variables, representing any form of 
oligopolistic behaviour, arising from a static or dynamic game. Moreover, CV provides 
information on changes in the degree of competition in the industry over time. Third, although 
the CV approach assumes short-run profit maximization equilibrium, the association between 
the estimated CV parameters and the deviation from marginal cost pricing remains. It is a 
valid technique for characterizing the outcome relative to the perfectly competitive, socially 
optimal benchmark, under marginal cost pricing (Shaffer, 2004).  
 Specifically, we jointly estimate the following three equation system (2-5) using 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), following Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) and Brissimis et 
al., (2008). Equation (2) is a translog cost function. The revenue equation in (3) is obtained 
from the first-order profit maximization condition of banks with respect to the quantity of 
loans. Equation (4) is an inverse loan demand function. Hence:  
c
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In Equation (2), after omitting the subscripts i and t for brevity, C is the total non-
interest expense, measured by total cost minus total interest expense; q is the quantity of loans; 
d denotes total loanable funds, measured by the sum of total deposits and total money market 
funding; and w is banks’ cost, measured by the ratio of total non-interest expense over the sum 
of loans and total loanable funds. Linear homogeneity of degree one in input prices is obtained 
by dividing C and w  by w  before taking logs. Following standard practice, we normalise 
each output quantity and input price variable using its geometric mean, such that, the 
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estimated first-order coefficients can be explained directly as the cost elasticity at the sample 
mean. Consequently, both 1b and 3b are positive as required by the positivity of marginal cost. 
 In equation (3), the dependent variable is the difference between interest income (R) 
and interest expense (E), weighted by the ratio of loans to total loanable funds. In equation (4), 
p is the implicit price of loans, calculated as the ratio of interest income (on loans) to total 
loans; and gdp is real GDP growth rate, which captures the demand for financial services on 
the price of loans (a positive relationship is expected because higher demand for financial 
services induces higher prices). The total assets variable, totalassets, is used to capture the size 
effect. Capitalization (Cap) is measured by capital divided by total assets; it represents 
differences in risk attitude across banks. The industry price elasticity is given by 0t . The 
CV parameter to be estimated is given by: )/(*)/(
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magnitude of the estimated CV elasticity, the lower is the degree of competition, and vice 
versa. If the market structure is characterised by Cournot competition, θit is the market share 
of the ith bank (i.e. 

F
i
itit qq
1
/ ). In the case of perfect competition, θit = 0; under pure 
monopoly, θit = 1; and, θit < 0 implies pricing below marginal cost, due to non-optimizing 
behaviour by banks. The θit < 0 case may reflect, as well, a super-competition condition as 
found by Shaffer (1993) in Canadian banking and Gruben and McComb (2003) in Mexican 
banking. For the sake of tractability, we impose the restriction that tit    in Equation (3). 
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Hence, t  indicates the industry average of the degree of competition at time t5. To investigate 
the short-term changes in the degree of competition, we estimate yearly θ, using year dummy 
variables, while to estimate η, we use dummy variables for every two years. We cannot use 
year dummy variables to estimate η, because they are linearly dependent on the time-specific 
control variable, gdp. Table 5 summarises the definitions of variables in Equations (2)-(4).  
   [Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.2 Second stage analysis: financial reforms and competitive conduct 
In Stage II, we examine the impact of deregulation and prudential re-regulation on the degree 
of competition, controlling for other factors. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
θ = α0 + α1deinterest + α2bigbang + α3universal + α4CR3 + α5gdp + e  (5)  
The dependent variable, θ, is the banking industry average of the degree of 
competition (derived from Stage I). We focus on three important regulatory initiatives. First, 
the re-implementation of interest rate deregulation in 1997, is measured using a dummy 
variable, deinterest. It takes the value of one for the period 1993-1996, and zero otherwise. 
The second initiative, the removal of the regulatory barrier between merchant and commercial 
banking in 2001, is captured using a dummy variable, universal. The dummy takes the value 
of zero till 2001 and one thereafter. The third element relates to the ‘big bang’ measures, 
which were announced in July 2004. The reforms included a dramatic increase of minimum 
capital base requirement from N2 billion to N25 billion, with the requirement that banks had 
to fully comply before December 2005 otherwise they would be de-licensed,  which led to a 
remarkable reduction of the number of banks from 89 in 2004 to 25 in 2005. The dummy, 
bigbang, is used to capture the measures; it takes the value of zero till 2004 and one thereafter. 
                                                 
5 As in Shaffer (2004) for the restriction  i ,   measures the competitive conduct of the average firm. In 
the case of a dominant firm (or cartel) plus a competitive fringe, the estimated value of   represents a weighted 
average of the perfectly competitive and collusive values, and is larger than the perfectly competitive value. 
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Further, we take into account the impact of market structure, which is measured using 
a three-bank concentration ratio (CR3), on the degree of competition. The traditional SCP 
paradigm indicates that the presence of a few larger banks restricts competition; it predicts a 
negative relation between concentration and competition. In contrast, the efficiency structure 
hypothesis predicts that concentration is induced by the increase of market share gained by 
more efficient banks, which suggests that concentration is not a reliable indicator of the degree 
of competition (Demsetz, 1973). Also, we introduce real GDP growth rate (gdp). The 
motivation to control for economic growth earlier in Equation (3) differs from the present case 
in Equation (5); here, it is intended to capture the impact of the change in economic 
fundamentals on the dynamics of competition. As argued by Sudhir et al. (2005) and Barnea 
and Kim (2007), the change in economic fundamentals affects expectations of market 
participants about the future level of demand, which may change the competitive interactions 
between market participants. Moreover, it is useful to distinguish between fundamentals-
driven and conduct-driven components of competitive interactions. Furthermore, Haltiwanger 
and Harrington (1991) and Kandori (1991) indicate that these oligopolistic dynamics crucially 
depend on whether market participants’ competitive strategy is long-term forward looking or 
myopic. Specifically, if future demand is expected to grow (fall), the cooperation between 
market participants is easier (more difficult) because their competitive strategy has a long-
term outlook. On the other hand, if the market participants’ competitive strategy is myopic, 
the opposite is true. The definition of variables used in Equation (5) is summarized in Table 6.  
   [Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.3 Stage III: Direct and indirect effects of financial reforms on bank behaviour 
Our final stage is to investigate the impact of financial reforms on bank risk taking and bank 
productive efficiency, taking into account both the direct effect of policy actions and the 
indirect impact through competition. We specify the following model: 
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Risk-takingit = f(competitiont, reform-initiativest, economic-conditionst,  
bank-specific-characteristicsit)      (6) 
Productive-efficiencyit=f(competitiont, reform-initiativest, economic-conditionst,  
bank-specific-characteristicsit)      (7) 
In equations (6) and (7), the dependent variables measure credit risk of bank i at time t 
and productive efficiency of bank i at time t, respectively. Bank risk taking is measured using 
a proxy variable, the loan loss provisions to loans ratio, as an ex-post indicator of credit risk. 
Bank-specific productive efficiency is derived from the first-stage analysis using DEA. It is 
predicted that financial reforms affect bank productive efficiency and bank risk taking through 
the direct impact as well as indirect impact through competition. We therefore control for the 
competitiveness condition and banking sector reforms in the bank risk taking and bank 
productive efficiency equations. The degree of competition is given by the CV parameters 
estimated from the first-stage. Reform initiatives refer to the three important financial reforms 
in Nigeria, using the dummy variables dinterest, universal and bigbang, as previously defined. 
We also consider the influence of macroeconomic conditions, measured by real GDP growth 
rate. An increase in aggregate economic activity is expected to increase borrowers’ cash flow 
and decrease the probability of loan default, hence a negative effect of real GDP growth rate 
on loan losses is predicted (Salas and Saurina, 2003). The expected sign of the relation 
between macroeconomic conditions and bank productive efficiency, however, is ambiguous. 
Although higher economic growth may stimulate demand for financial services, it also allows 
banks to charge higher margins. Since banks operate in an imperfectly competitive market, the 
two effects would offset each other, and the net effect is an empirical issue.  
 Regarding the bank-specific determinants of bank risk taking and bank productive 
efficiency, we use slightly different sets of variables, taking into account the association 
between the two important aspects of bank performance. In the bank-risk taking equation, we 
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take into account the size effect, measured by total assets (taking natural logarithm). The 
literature presents a dichotomous view on the relationship between size and bank-risk taking: 
on the one hand, larger banks tend to diversify and hence reduce risk; on the other hand, larger 
banks may take higher risk if they are motivated by the too-big-to-fail incentive. We also 
consider bank capitalization, measured by the ratio of capital to total assets. While the 
objective of the implementation of capital requirement along with deregulation is to enhance 
the stability of the banking system, the relationship between capital ratio and risk taking is 
controversial. The increase of risk goes commensurably with the increase of capital if the 
purpose of the imposition of higher capital requirement is to enhance the ability of banks to 
internalize risk taking (Altunbus, et al., 2007). Indeed, literature has indicated that banks 
comply with mandatory risk-weighted capital requirement ratio via: increasing the capital 
level; decreasing the risky assets; or increasing the capital level and risky assets 
simultaneously (Santos, 2001). Alternatively, higher capitalization may induce banks to 
behave prudentially since the option value of deposit insurance is decreasing in bank’s 
leverage, leading to a negative relationship between capital and risk taking (Konishi and 
Yasuda, 2004). We also control for the degree of specialization. Diversification by jointly 
producing different types of outputs may lead to a decrease of risk. However, asymmetric 
information in the loan market may make specialization beneficial for risk management, since 
screening and monitoring are easier and more effective (Mukherjee et al., 2001).  We follow 
Mukherjee et al., (2001), among others, and measure the degree of specification by the 
Herfindahl index of the outputs, i.e., 


2
1
2
i
iSSP , and 


2
1
/
i
iii yyS . Since our concern is on 
the impact of the degree of specialization on credit risk, here, we use an interest-income 
( 1y )/non-interest income ( 2y ) frame to categorize bank on-balance sheet and off-balance 
sheet activities. SP =1 means that a bank is totally specialized, and SP=0.5 implies that a bank 
produces totally diversified outputs (i.e., interest income and non-interest income have the 
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equal share in total income). We finally introduce net interest margin, measured by net interest 
income divided by total interest earning assets. Arguably, net interest margin is negatively 
associated with bank credit risk since banks with higher net interest margin face higher 
bankruptcy cost and may behave more prudentially (Salas and Saurina, 2002). However, if the 
higher interest margin is due to higher risk premium associated with higher expected 
possibility of default, a positive net interest margin and credit risk taking is expected.  
 With respect to the bank productive efficiency equation, we also consider the size 
effect. Policy initiatives to promote larger banks usually assume the existence of economies of 
scale. Larger banks are expected to yield higher productive efficiency because size facilitates 
the rationalization of human capital, network and back-office and economizes the utilization 
of inputs. Also, larger banks are expected to enjoy larger consumer-bases and wider 
distributional channels and hence produce more output from a given level of inputs. In 
addition, we consider bank capitalisation. Capital adequacy requirement is used by regulators 
as the central prudential re-regulation instrument during financial reforms. However, it is not 
clear precisely how capitalization influences bank production efficiency. On the one hand, 
well-capitalized banks have higher productive efficiency because they face less constraint to 
expand outputs. On the other hand, well-capitalized banks tend to set more demanding 
conditions on the supply of loans due to a more cautious attitude towards output expansion 
(Bolt and Tieman, 2004). We finally allow for the interrelationship between bank productive 
efficiency and bank-risk taking. Indeed, since risk management is the inherent component of 
bank intermediation process, banks with poor senior management may have problems in 
monitoring both their output and their loan customers (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Table 7 
summarises the definitions of variables in equations (6) and (7). 
   [Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
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4.4 Data 
We retrieve from BankScope annual balance sheet and income statement data on Nigerian 
commercial banks over 1993-2008. We start with the universe of all commercial banks and 
after checking the data for completeness, we obtain a final unbalanced panel sample of 91 
banks with a total of 630 observations. Real GDP growth rate over 1993-2008 is collected 
from IMF International Financial Statistics Database. All variables used in our analysis are 
either expressed as ratios or measured in real terms, using GDP deflator with 2000 as the base 
year. Table 8 provides summary statistics for the variables.  
5. Estimation and testing results 
5.1 Results of first-step analysis 
5.1.1 DEA productive efficiency scores 
We applied DEA, as in Equation (1), to 630 bank/year observations to construct a grand 
frontier. The average productive efficiency and standard deviation of output-oriented 
productive efficiency are presented in Table 9 and illustrated in Figure 2. Overall, our results 
indicate a general improvement in output production from a given input level, especially after 
2004; the mean of productive efficiency post-2004 is higher than the average mean for 1993-
2008. The dispersion of productive efficiency measured by its standard deviation appears to be 
stable up to 2004; for each of 2006 and 2007, it is lower than the average for 1993-2008. 
   [insert Table 9 and Figure 2 about here] 
5.1.2  The degree of competition: the estimated CV parameters 
The equations (2)-(4) are estimated simultaneously using SUR and the results are reported in 
Table 11. All of the 35 parameters are highly significant (at 10% or less). Our estimated cost 
function meets the non-negative marginal costs regularity condition, as 1b and 3b are positive. 
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As for the demand equation, the estimated industry demand elasticity ( ) is negative, 
as required by economic theory. The evidence ( 1 ) also indicates that higher GDP growth rate 
is associated with higher implicit interest rates, suggesting that higher demand for financial 
services allows banks to charge higher loan rates.  Further, the estimates for the size effect 
( 2 ) and capitalization ( 3 ) indicate that each is positively associated with the implicit 
interest rate on loans. The positive size-price relation may due to the wider distribution 
channel of larger banks, which gives bigger banks higher bargain power in the provision of 
loans. The positive capitalization-price relationship indicates that well-capitalized banks are 
more risk averse and thus require a higher margin in order to cover the higher costs of equity 
financing compared to external financing (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004). Indeed, 
as noted by Kim et al., (2005) and De Jonghe and Vennet (2008), the capitalization level and 
the ability of banks to diversify horizontally could be strategic variables banks use to 
differentiate themselves from their rivals to soften competition.  
Regarding the changes in the degree of competition over our sample period (1993-
2008), Figure 3 shows the estimated values of t  together with their 95% confidence interval. 
It is shown that, over the period, the results reject 1 , pure monopoly, except for 2008. The 
competitive conditions in years 1996 and 1998 are characterized by a super competition 
situation, while the conditions in 1995 and 1997 reflect perfect competition; for the rest of the 
sample period, Nigerian commercial banking demonstrates a certain level of oligopoly. 
Overall, the estimated CV parameters suggest the change in the degree of competition in 
Nigerian commercial banking are phased into three sub-periods: an increase in the degree of 
competition during 1993-1998; a decrease in the degree of competition during 1998-2001; and 
an increase in the degree of competition during 2001-2008. 
   [insert Table 10 and Figure 3 about here] 
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5.2 Results of stage II analysis: financial reforms and competitive conduct 
The estimation results for equation (5), regarding the impact of financial reforms on the 
degree of competition, are reported in Table 11. 
    [insert Table 11 about here] 
 The results show that deinterest, the proxy for the reimplementation of interest rate 
deregulation, is positive and statistically significant at 7% level. Universal, the proxy for the 
adaptation of universal banking, is also positive and significant (1% level). This evidence 
suggests that the deregulation of interest rate and the expansion opportunities into universal 
banking do not promote competition but rather nurture collusion. This result is consistent with 
the view that deregulation over both interest rates and banking business lines essentially give 
more scope for collusive behaviour of banks in an oligopolistic market. In addition, the 
coefficient of bigbang, is negative; however, the result is not statistically significant.   
 The market share occupied by the largest three banks, CR3, has a statistically 
significant positive coefficient, suggesting that increased concentration increases the degree of 
collusion in the market place, in line with the prediction of the traditional SCP paradigm. 
Further, the estimated coefficient of gdp is not statistically significant; indicating the difficulty 
for market participants to formulate representative expectations about future demand, given 
the overall unstable macroeconomic conditions during the sample period. 
5.3 Stage III results: Direct and indirect effects of financial reforms 
We investigate the impact of financial reforms on bank risk taking and bank productive 
efficiency by estimating equations (6) and (7), respectively. We also take into account several 
econometric issues. The endogenous variable is limited (or censored) in the sense that the 
productive efficiency scores derived from the grand DEA frontier can be measured only 
within the range from zero to one. Conventional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is 
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likely to yield inconsistent parameter estimates. Hence, we use a censored Tobit regression 
model to handle the problem. However, the inclusion of bank risk taking as an explanatory 
variable in the productive efficiency regression model may lead to potential endogeneity 
problems, because productive (in)efficiency also affects risk taking. To deal with this concern, 
we test for the endogeneity of bank-risk taking using the approach proposed by Smith and 
Blundell (1986). We fail to reject the exogeneity of bank-risk taking6, hence the standard 
Tobit model and a separate estimation of bank-risk taking seem to be plausible specifications. 
Further, we take into account the panel feature of our dataset. We perform likelihood-ratio 
tests comparing a random Tobit against a pooled Tobit model of the bank productive 
efficiency equation. Our results indicate that a random Tobit model is a more suitable choice. 
We perform a Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects against pooled 
model and further a Sargan-Hansen statistic test to decide whether to use the fixed effects or 
the random effects specification of the bank risk taking model7. Our evidence is in favour of 
the random effects model. The results are reported in Table 12.  
    [insert Table 12 about here] 
First, we focus on results for the bank risk taking equation. Regarding the direct impact 
of financial reforms on bank risk taking, the evidence reported in Table 12 shows that interest 
rate deregulation and the adaptation of universal banking both negatively and significantly 
affect bank risk taking. The negative relation between interest rate deregulation and bank risk 
taking suggests that deregulation of interest rate opens up opportunities for banks to use 
pricing as a risk management tool, i.e. banks are able to price risk according to the expected 
default risk. The negative impact of the adaptation of universal banking on bank-risk taking 
reflects the risk diversification benefit across different business lines. In contrast, the results 
                                                 
6 The instruments we use are net interest margin and the degree of competition, which are included in the bank 
risk taking equation but not in the bank productive efficiency equation. 
7 The Sargan-Hansen test has advantages over the Hausman fixed-versus-random effects test, because it is robust 
to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and within-group correlation.  
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show a positive and statistically significant coefficient of “big bang”, indicating that the 
dramatic increase of the minimum capital base requirement is positively related to bank risk 
taking. These results seem to suggest that the increase of the minimum regulatory capital base 
may have induced a proportionate increase of risk taking, which is consistent with the 
statistics we presented in Table 4. Further, with respect to the impact of competition, the 
estimated coefficient is statistically significant and positive, which implies that an increase in 
competition yields lower risk taking, as proposed by the “competition-stability” view.  
 Regarding the bank-specific characteristics, the results indicate that banks with higher 
capitalization have lower risk taking, confirming our previous argument that well-capitalized 
banks are more risk averse. This result does not conflict with our results of positive relation 
between the “big bang” on bank capital requirement and bank-risk taking as the latter is a 
policy on the level of capital not on the ratio of capital to total assets. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient of the “big bang” refers to the average impact on the industry, without accounting 
for the heterogeneity cross banks8. Our results also show that higher net interest margins are 
associated with higher risk taking, implying that banks that charge higher risk premium 
(associated with higher expected probability of default) face higher ex-post credit risk. In 
addition, the estimated coefficient of the degree of diversification is negative, which concurs 
the view that diversification by jointly producing different types of bank outputs may lead to a 
decrease of risk. Finally, the size effect, measured by total assets, indicates the risk benefit of 
economies of scale, although it is not statistically significant.  
 Second, we consider the regression results for the bank productive efficiency model. In 
terms of the direct impact of reform initiatives, our results indicate a substantial gain in bank 
productive efficiency following the reimplementation of interest rate deregulation, the 
                                                 
8 To test for this, we introduce the interaction term between capitalization and dummy variable for the “big 
bang”, and re-run the regression. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term is negative but not significant. 
The coefficient of the policy dummy remains significantly positive (0.65%), while the coefficient of 
capitalization keeps significantly negative (1%). The estimated results are available from the authors on request.  
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adaptation of universal banking and the significant tightening of capital requirement, as the 
coefficients on three reforms dummies are all positive and statistically significant. Although 
these three important events in the Nigerian banking reforms all appear to stimulate 
productive efficiency, there are three further interpretations of the propagation mechanisms of 
these reforms. First, with respect to interest rate deregulation, it may be the case that the 
freedom of banks to raise interest rate on deposits and loans enhances banks’ operational 
flexibility in providing financial services. Banks are able to carry out financial intermediation 
that might not have been profitable under the regime of regulated interest rate. Second, 
regarding the adaptation of universal banking, the evidence may be interpreted to reflect the 
cross-selling behaviour of banks i.e., banks sell existing and new products to the additional 
consumers brought about by the expansion of business lines, which enable banks to produce 
more outputs from a given level of inputs.  Third, the positive outcome of the “big bang” 
suggests a reshuffle of the market share, resulting into an increase of outputs for the existing 
market participants. The results may also be interpreted in terms of positive synergy effect of 
consolidation as a result of recapitalization.  
Regarding the impact of competition on bank productive efficiency, the significant and 
negative coefficient confirms that an increase of competition may enhance bank production 
performance, as predicted by the microeconomic theory. Macroeconomic conditions, 
measured by real GDP growth rate, appear to be negatively associated with bank productive 
efficiency, suggesting that banks production performance decreases in a more favourable 
economic environment. This result suggests that more favourable macroeconomic conditions 
may induce an increase of the demand for financial services on the one hand and an increase 
of banks’ ability to charge higher interest rate, on the other. Indeed, the estimated results of 
the demand equation (4) did suggest that higher GDP growth rate is associated with higher 
implicit interest rate ( 1  in Table 11). Since banks operate in an imperfectly competitive 
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market, the two effects on banks production performance may offset each other. The negative 
relationship between real GDP growth rate and bank productive efficiency seems to suggest 
that the expected improvement in productive efficiency induced by the increase of demand is 
outweighed by the decrease in the quantity of production due to the increase of interest rate.  
 Regarding the influence of bank risk taking on bank productive efficiency, our results 
indicate that the increase in bank risk taking is inversely related to bank productive efficiency, 
as expected. In terms of other bank-specific characteristics, the results show a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for total assets, which suggests that banks enjoy economies 
of scale. The negative estimated coefficient of capitalization indicates that well-capitalized 
banks have a lower bank productive efficiency, which probably reflects a more conservative 
attitude of well-capitalized banks towards expansion of production. 
Although the failure to reject the exogeneity of bank risk taking rules out the 
instrumental simultaneous estimation of bank productive efficiency and bank risk taking 
equations, there is a possibility that bank productive efficiency and bank risk taking are 
subject to common shocks which we did not fully consider in our specification, leading to 
contemporaneous correlation of disturbances from the two equations. Hence, risk taking and 
risk management are central to banks’ production process, and are governed by banks’ overall 
operational philosophy, analysis and control.  To accommodate this, we also estimate the risk-
taking and productive efficiency equations simultaneously using a full-information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) estimator as a check for robustness.  The results are reported in Table 13.  
  [insert Table 13 about here] 
As shown in Table 13, the simultaneous estimation results do not change the central 
findings from single equation estimation in Table 12. The deregulation of interest rate and the 
adaptation of universal banking are still positively related to bank-risk taking while the 
opposite is true for the imposition of “big bang”. Moreover, the increase of competition seems 
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to enhance safety of the loan portfolio. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are 
similar to the ones in Table 13, and the results are significant as well. With respect to 
productive efficiency, all three important reforms appear to promote productive efficiency, 
although the result for adaptation of universal banking is not significant. The increase of 
competition, again, positively contributes to the increase of productive efficiency. Finally, the 
result also suggests that banks with higher risk taking have lower productive efficiency, 
although it is only significant at 19% level.  
To summarize, we find that financial reforms influence bank competition and through 
competition affect bank risk taking and bank productive efficiency; this is the indirect effect. 
In addition, financial reforms have a direct impact on bank risk taking and bank productive 
efficiency. The relationship between competition and bank risk taking is negative, suggesting 
that banks behave more prudentially in an increasingly competitive environment. The 
relationship between competition and bank productive efficiency, however, is positive, 
implying that banks make effort to catch up with the best practices in view of an increase in 
competition. We also find evidence suggesting a negative association between bank risk 
taking and bank productive efficiency.  
 Additionally, our results suggest that deregulation and prudential re-regulation affect 
bank risk taking and bank productive efficiency in different ways in terms of both direct 
impact and indirect impact through competition.  The deregulation initiatives offer banks the 
opportunity to price risk and to diversify their business lines, which promote both productive 
efficiency of banks as well as the safety of banks’ loan portfolio. The decrease of risk taking 
tends to further reinforce the increase of productive efficiency. However, the positive outcome 
of deregulation on both bank-risk taking and bank productive efficiency may be offset by the 
negative impact on the degree of competition. In contrast, the implementation of tightening 
minimum capital base brings about the increase of bank risk taking as well as the increase of 
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bank productive efficiency. Moreover, there is a concern that the increase of risk taking may 
counterbalance the increase of bank productive efficiency. Unlike the impact of deregulation 
initiatives, the impact of tightening minimum capital base on bank risk taking and bank 
productive efficiency seems to be exclusively associated with its direct impact. Its impact on 
the degree of competition is insignificant (see Table 12).  Figures 4, 5, 6 graphically 
demonstrate those relationships.  
  [insert Figures 4, 5, 6 about here] 
6. Conclusion 
Despite the fact that recently the process of deregulation (and concomitant prudential re-
regulation) has been a dominant feature in financial markets of developed and developing 
countries, the empirical work on the impact of such policy reforms on bank competition and 
performance is limited and inconclusive. To explore this issue further, we develop a three-
stage procedure and perform a systematic investigation of the interaction among variables that 
proxy financial reforms, bank competition, bank risk-taking and bank production efficiency. 
We apply the procedure to the reform experience of the Nigerian commercial banking sector 
during the period 1993-2008.  
 Our empirical results suggest that deregulation and prudential re-regulation influence 
bank risk taking and bank productive efficiency directly (direct impact) as well as through 
their impact on bank competitive conditions (indirect impact). We find evidence to suggest 
that the increase in bank competition is beneficial for a well-functioning banking sector 
because increased competition is associated with reduction in bank risk taking and enhanced 
bank productive efficiency. As a result, our findings lend support to policy initiatives that 
foster bank competition, at least in the context of the banking reform experiments that were 
undertaken in Nigeria during 1993-2008.  
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 Finally, in line with Allen and Gale (2004), our analysis shows the multiple dimension 
of the issue of regulation and its effect on competition, on productive efficiency and financial 
stability. We recommend that future research on banking reforms should carefully account for 
all the factors at work in order to enhance the empirical relevance for policy implications. 
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Figure 1: The development of commercial banking sector, 1993-2007 
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Table 1: Selected market structure and performance indicators, 1993 – 2007 
Year 
number 
of 
banks b 
Number of 
branches b CR3 a Roe a 
Net 
interest 
margin a 
Overhead 
cost/total 
assets a 
1993 66 2358 0.892 0.269 0.088 0.089 
1994 65 2403 0.794 0.313 0.061 0.076 
1995 64 2368 0.647 0.291 0.079 0.098 
1996 64 2407 0.478 0.315 0.073 0.095 
1997 64 2330 0.451 0.445 0.105 0.091 
1998 51 2107 0.386 0.307 0.100 0.085 
1999 57 2234 0.408 0.25 0.079 0.075 
2000 90 2234 0.414 0.325 0.085 0.082 
2001 90 3247 0.388 0.225 0.107 0.092 
2002 90 3247 0.391 0.091 0.103 0.09 
2003 90 3010 0.387 0.207 0.092 0.091 
2004 89 3247 0.388 0.204 0.085 0.078 
2005 25 3492 0.445 0.154 0.064 0.054 
2006 25 3004 0.511 0.191 0.055 0.048 
2007 24 3897 0.399 0.183 0.054 0.044 
Data source: a collected from A New Database on Financial Development and Structure, World Bank. 
                    b collect from CBN.  
 
Table 2: Profile of the NPLs in Nigerian commercial banking, 1993-2007 
Year NPL ratio (%) NPL Total credit 
1993 38.7 18597.67 48056 
1994 38.1 35289.74 92624 
1995 29.5 41638.07 141146 
1996 32.7 55342.13 169242 
1997 24.9 57419.4 230600 
1998 20.3 55397.69 272895 
1999 26.4 93213.38 353081 
2000 21.5 109284.9 508302 
2001 16.9 134551.7 796164 
2002 21.3 203335.8 954628 
2003 20.45 247451.7 1210033 
2004 21.6 328156.3 1519242 
2005 24.1 479866.2 1991146 
2006 8.77 221380.8 2524297 
2007 8.44 406258.4 4813488 
Data source: Adam (2002), Onaolapo (2008) and CBN 
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Table 3: Risk-weighted capital adequacy, 2004-2007 
 CRAR (%) Qualify capital base Risk-weighted assets 
2004 14.17 351021 2477212 
2005 17.86 554520 3104815 
2006 22.6 1041000 4606195 
2007 20.9 1711000 8186603 
Data source: CBN 
 
Table 4: input-output specification in Equation (1) 
Inputs Outputs 
X1: Interest expense Y1: Loans 
X2: Non-interest expense Y2: Other earning assets 
X3: Financial capital Y3: Deposits 
 
 
Table 5: the definition of variables in Equation (2) –(4) 
Variables Description 
Translog cost  function (2) 
 Total non-interest expense ( itC ) = total cost – total interest expense 
 The quantity of loans ( itq ) = The book value of loans 
 Total loanable fund ( itd ) = total deposits + total money market funding 
 Total non-interest expense price 
( itw ) 
= total non-interest expense/(loans + total loanable 
fund) 
Revenue equation (3) 
 Total interest income ( itR ) = total interest income received 
 Total interest expense ( itE ) = total interest expenditure 
 The ratio of total loans to total 
loanable fund ( )/ itit dq ) 
= total loans/total loanable fund 
The inverse demand equation  (4) 
 Implicit interest rate of loans ( itp ) = total interest income/total loans 
 Real GDP growth rate (gdp) = real GDP growth rate 
 Size effect (total assets) = total assets 
 Capitalization (cap) = financial capital/total assets 
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Table 6: The definition of variables in Equation (5) 
Variables Description 
Dependent variable 
competition ( t ) The conjectural variations parameters derived 
from jointly estimation of Equation (2) – (4) 
Explanatory variables  
 Deinterest  Set equal to 1 for 1997-2008, 0 otherwise 
 Bigbang Set equal to 1 for 2005-2008, 0 otherwise 
 Universal Set equal to 1 for 2001-2008, 0 otherwise 
 CR3 Three-bank concentration ratio 
 Gdp Real GDP growth rate 
 
Table 7: The definition of variables in bank productive efficiency and bank risk taking equation 
Variables Description 
Dependent variable 
 Bank-specific productive efficiency Derived from the first-stage using DEA 
 Bank-specific credit risk = loan loss provisions/total loans 
Independent variable shared by both equations 
             Industry wide variables: competition, reforms and economic condition 
 Competition The conjectural variations parameters derived 
from jointly estimation of Equation (2) – (4) 
 Reforms A vector of three dummy variables: (1). 
deinterest: set equal to 1 for 1997-2008, 0 
otherwise; (2). Universal: set equal to 1 for 
2001-2008, 0 otherwise (3). Bigbang: set equal 
to 1 for 2005-2008, 0 otherwise 
 Economic condition  Real GDP growth rate 
             bank-specific characteristics 
 Size effect = total assets 
 Capitalization = financial capital/total assets 
Independent variable specific for bank risk taking equation 
 The degree of specification 


2
1
2
i
iSSP , 


2
1
/
i
iii yyS ,  
1y : interest-income; 2y :non-interest income 
 Net interest margin = (total interest income-total interest 
expense)/(loans + other earning assets) 
Independent variable specific for productive efficiency equation 
 Credit risk = loan loss provisions/total loans 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics of the variables  
Variables 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Median 
Loans 630 29.442 148.741 0.001 1893.004 5.498 
Other earning assets 630 64.601 431.621 0.118 7085.522 8.925 
Deposits 630 49.278 172.682 0.014 2203.300 12.748 
Interest expense 630 4.595 25.038 0.001 378.499 0.907 
Non-interest expense 630 7.065 34.166 0.073 406.958 1.327 
Financial capital 630 14.813 81.363 0.013 989.079 1.892 
Loan loss provisions 
to total loan ratio  630 0.059 0.114 0.000 1.677 0.034 
Capitalization  630 0.152 0.276 0.017 5.586 0.116 
Net interest margin 630 0.076 0.053 -0.159 0.347 0.076 
The degree of 
specification 630 0.598 0.096 0.500 0.980 0.568 
Total loanable fund 630 49.241 173.147 0.014 2203.300 12.079 
Non-interest expense 
price 630 0.088 0.077 0.005 1.688 0.080 
Total interest income 630 11.024 63.619 0.001 880.380 2.080 
Total assets 630 104.503 574.986 0.170 8354.947 17.200 
Implicit interest rate 
on loans 630 0.477 0.562 0.002 8.582 0.370 
CR3 16 0.487 0.155 0.386 0.892 0.412 
Real GDP growth rate 
(%) 16 6.019 5.285 -0.307 21.180 5.356 
Note: Data source: Bankscope and IMF International Financial Statistics Database. 
Data, if not expressed in ratio, are measured in Naira mill and are deflated by GDP deflator using 2000 as the 
base year.  
 
Table 9: DEA estimates of output-oriented productive efficiency, by year 
Year Mean Std. Dev. 
1993 0.371 0.262 
1994 0.389 0.234 
1995 0.396 0.210 
1996 0.423 0.209 
1997 0.536 0.222 
1998 0.534 0.204 
1999 0.518 0.229 
2000 0.474 0.210 
2001 0.552 0.222 
2002 0.468 0.209 
2003 0.500 0.197 
2004 0.506 0.194 
2005 0.607 0.254 
2006 0.780 0.165 
2007 0.845 0.170 
2008 0.776 0.349 
Average 1993-
2008 0.542 0.221 
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Figure 2: Year by year pattern of productive efficiency, 1993-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Estimated conjectural variations parameters, 1993-2008 
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Table 10: Results of simultaneous estimation of Eqs, (2)-(4) 
Parameters Coef. 
Robust 
Std.Err P-value 95% lower 95% upper 
0b  2.883 0.002 0.000 2.880 2.886 
1b  0.345 0.009 0.000 0.328 0.362 
2b  0.133 0.005 0.000 0.124 0.142 
3b  0.648 0.010 0.000 0.629 0.667 
4b  0.119 0.002 0.000 0.116 0.122 
8b  -0.125 0.002 0.000 -0.130 -0.120 
0  0.414 0.076 0.000 0.264 0.564 
 1993 0.506 0.057 0.000 0.394 0.618 
 1994 0.634 0.071 0.000 0.494 0.774 
 1995 0.006 0.004 0.102 -0.002 0.014 
 1996 -0.344 0.026 0.000 -0.394 -0.294 
 1997 -0.013 0.007 0.048 -0.026 0.000 
 1998 -0.307 0.022 0.000 -0.350 -0.264 
 1999 0.184 0.015 0.000 0.155 0.213 
 2000 0.189 0.016 0.000 0.158 0.220 
 2001 0.747 0.105 0.000 0.541 0.953 
 2002 0.648 0.104 0.000 0.444 0.852 
 2003 0.534 0.112 0.000 0.315 0.753 
 2004 0.587 0.122 0.000 0.349 0.825 
 2005 0.543 0.137 0.000 0.275 0.811 
 2006 0.541 0.115 0.000 0.316 0.766 
 2007 0.547 0.065 0.000 0.421 0.673 
 2008 0.796 0.119 0.000 0.564 1.028 
1/ 93-94 -0.543 0.062 0.000 -0.664 -0.422 
1/ 95-96 -0.717 0.051 0.000 -0.818 -0.616 
1/ 97-98 -0.736 0.047 0.000 -0.828 -0.644 
1/ 99-00 -0.627 0.048 0.000 -0.722 -0.532 
1/ 01-02 -0.592 0.046 0.000 -0.683 -0.501 
1/ 03-04 -0.619 0.046 0.000 -0.709 -0.529 
1/ 05-06 -0.743 0.051 0.000 -0.842 -0.644 
1/ 07-08 -0.736 0.050 0.000 -0.834 -0.638 
0  -1.236 0.138 0.000 -1.506 -0.966 
1  0.007 0.004 0.084 -0.001 0.015 
2  0.607 0.050 0.000 0.510 0.704 
3  0.208 0.084 0.014 0.043 0.373 
R-square for (2) 0.9993 
R-square for (3) 0.9989 
R-square for (4) 0.3861 
Note: the standard error reported is White’s (1980) heterogeneity adjusted.  
Since linear homogeneity of degree one in input prices is imposed ex-ante estimation, the estimated 
coefficients of b4, b6, b7, and b9 are not reported.   
 41
Table 11: Effects on the degree of competition 
 Coef. Std. Err. P value 
Dinterest 0.429* 0.215 0.073 
Bigbang -0.117 0.165 0.493 
Universal 0.641** 0.208 0.011 
CR3 2.151*** 0.589 0.004 
Gdp 0.003 0.016 0.852 
Constant -1.317** 0.431 0.012 
Prob> F(  5,    10) 0.002 
 R-squared    0.816 
Adj R-squared 0.725 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  Prob > chi2  =  0.684 
Durbin's alternative test for autocorrelation Prob > chi2 = 0.807 
Note: gdpCRuniversalbigbangerestdet 654210 3int   is regressed via OLS. 
The number of observation is 16 (i.e. 1993-2008). The diagnostic test for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation suggest the rejection of the null hypothesis.  
*, **, ***, indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 12: Regression results of bank productive efficiency and bank-risk taking Equations 
Dependent variable: bank risk taking (loan loss provision /total loans) a 
 Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err b P>|z| 
Deinterest c -0.052*** 0.016 0.001 
Universal c -0.038* 0.020 0.055 
Bigbang c 0.068* 0.037 0.065 
Conjectural variations (CV) parameters d 0.060** 0.027 0.028 
Gdp -0.000 0.001 0.830 
Capitalization (financial capital/total assets) -0.078*** 0.013 0.000 
Size (ln(total assets)) -0.003 0.006 0.646 
Net interest margin 0.962*** 0.210 0.000 
The degree of specification -0.133 0.100 0.184 
Constant 0.432*** 0.053 0.000 
Sargan-Hansen statistic 0.432 
Dependent variable: bank productive efficiency a 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
Deinterest c 0.075*** 0.018 0.000 
Universal c 0.055* 0.029 0.057 
Bigbang c 0.107*** 0.026 0.000 
Conjectural variations (CV) parameters d -0.090*** 0.028 0.001 
Gdp -0.005*** 0.002 0.007 
Risk (loan loss provision/total loans) -0.203*** 0.050 0.000 
Capitalization (financial capital/total assets) -0.088*** 0.022 0.000 
Size (ln(total assets)) 0.086*** 0.009 0.000 
Constant 0.308*** 0.035 0.000 
Wald test of exogeneity  0.606 
Log likelihood  219.664 
Likelihood-ratio test of  
random Tobit V.s. pooled Tobit 0.000 
a The risk taking equation is estimated via random effect model and the productive efficiency model is estimated 
via random Tobit model. The two equation are estimated separately as the Wald test of exogeneity reject the 
endogeneity of risk taking in the productive efficiency model.  
b Allowing for that the observations drawn from the same bank from different time periods are likely to be 
correlated, we use cluster corrected standard errors to account for clustering for the same bank.  
c    Bilateral dummy variables related to the policy actions 
d  Estimated conjectural variations parameters derived from the estimation of Eqs (2)-(4). A smaller value 
indicates a increase of the degree of competition. 
*, **, and *** *: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Table 13: Results of simultaneous estimation of bank risk taking and bank productive 
efficiency equations 
Dependent variable: risk (loan loss provision /total loans) a 
 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P>|z| 
Deinterest c -0.053*** 0.017 0.001 
Universal c -0.043** 0.020 0.035 
Bigbang c 0.066** 0.033 0.044 
Conjectural variations (CV) parameters d 0.062** 0.028 0.025 
Gdp -0.000 0.001 0.927 
Capitalization (financial capital/total assets) -0.074*** 0.012 0.000 
Size (ln(total assets)) -0.005 0.004 0.268 
Net interest margin 0.934*** 0.195 0.000 
The degree of specification -0.167* 0.097 0.086 
Constant 0.461*** 0.054 0.000 
Dependent variable: productive efficiency a 
Deinterest c 0.072*** 0.027 0.008 
Universal c 0.042 0.028 0.142 
Bigbang c 0.094*** 0.030 0.002 
Conjectural variations (CV) parameters d -0.086** 0.036 0.017 
Gdp -0.004*** 0.001 0.000 
Risk (loan loss provision/total loans) -0.396 0.301 0.188 
Capitalization (financial capital/total assets) -0.117*** 0.041 0.005 
Size (ln(total assets)) 0.100*** 0.008 0.000 
Constant 0.343*** 0.123 0.005 
Note: the two equations are simultaneously estimated using cmp comment in STATA in which the 
productive efficiency model is considered as a censored Tobit. The standard error is robust to both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation for the same bank. *, **, and *** *: significant at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively 
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Figure 4: The interrelationship among deregulation of interest rate, competition, risk 
taking and productive efficiency 
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Figure 5: The interrelationship among adaptation of universal banking, competition, 
risk taking and productive efficiency 
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Figure 6: The interrelationship among the “big bang”, competition, risk taking and 
productive efficiency 
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